


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
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
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


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NATO: The Allies are expected to endorse US-USSR
strategic arms talks. (Page 3)



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NATO: Consultations in NATO, which begin on Monday, are expected to produce endorsement of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between the US and the Soviet Union, but the Allies are likely to have continuing concerns on several important issues.

The general attitude in NATO toward SALT is favorable. Of paramount concern, however, is that the US take fully into consideration European military and political interests and consult intensively before and during negotiations. The Allies are pleased by US plans for a comprehensive exchange of views, but have nagging fears that the US will enter NATO consultations with an inflexible position.

The Allies will seek assurance that the US will not accept any agreement which might have the effect of lessening Western European security. The UK and West Germany will probably urge that SALT bargaining explicitly include NATO nuclear forces and similar Soviet forces targeted against Europe. The UK would prefer as a first step to freeze such forces rather than to reduce them.

The West Germans, while supporting SALT in principle, fear an arms limitation arrangement which might appear to formalize the political status quo in Europe. They have urged parallel progress on the political problems deriving from the division of Germany and have advised the US not to accept nuclear parity without political concessions from the Soviets.

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